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FREE RIDERS ON THE FIRESTORM: HOW 
SHIFTING THE COSTS OF WILDFIRE 
MANAGEMENT TO RESIDENTS OF THE 
WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE WILL 
BENEFIT OUR PUBLIC FORESTS 
BENJAMIN REILLY* 
Abstract: Since the early 1900s, the federal land management agencies—the 
Forest Service in particular—have focused their wildfire management efforts on 
suppression. A century of wildfire suppression policy has created a buildup of 
natural fuels in the Nation’s forests that contribute to larger, more damaging fires 
today. This, coupled with the rapid development of the Wildland-Urban Interface, 
makes today’s wildfires a greater threat to human life and property. As a result, 
the federal government’s annual expenditures for wildfire management have bal-
looned in recent years. Relying on the billions of tax dollars spent each year to 
fight wildfire, individuals have continued to develop property on fire-prone lands 
and insurers continue to issue them policies with premiums that do not reflect the 
true risk of wildfire. This situation creates an implicit subsidy for residents of 
fire-prone lands, which presents many of the same pitfalls as the National Flood 
Insurance Program’s explicit subsidy for residents of flood-prone lands. This 
Note advocates for a reform of the way we pay for wildfire management. Specif-
ically, it encourages the federal government to implement a National Wildfire In-
surance Program that employs a “homeowner mandate” to shift the costs of wild-
fire management to those who directly benefit from it: the residents of the 
Wildland-Urban Interface. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2013, the Nation’s attention was captured by the devas-
tation of the Yarnell Hill fire that burned in central Arizona.1 A lightning strike 
started the fire, and it was fueled by an extended drought and strong winds.2 It 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Notes Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–
2015. 
 1 See Kirk Siegler, A Tragic Year for Wildland Firefighters Ends in Tragedy, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Dec. 28, 2013, 9:49 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/28/257771391/a-tragic-year-for-wildland-
firefighters-ends-in-reflection, archived at http://perma.cc/HSL7-SYUH (noting that the Yarnell fire 
captured the Nation’s attention to a degree that other fires have not). 
 2 Jason Samenow, Behind the Weather That Led to the Deadly Yarnell Hill Fire, WASH. POST, 
July 1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2013/07/01/the-weather-
that-led-to-the-deadly-yarnell-hill-fire/, archived at http://perma.cc/5HSG-K3ML. 
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destroyed 127 homes, making it a relatively destructive fire by history’s stand-
ards, but it will be remembered most for the fact that it overran and killed nine-
teen members of the Granite Mountain Hotshot Crew, firefighters who were 
on-site, hand cutting firebreaks along the blaze’s perimeter.3 The tragic loss of 
life made the Yarnell fire the third deadliest wildfire in American history.4 
In the past, the national attention given to wildfires has mimicked the life 
of fire itself: flaring up simultaneously with large fire seasons and fading just 
as quickly, once the flames are extinguished.5 Now, however, there appears to 
be a growing national desire to alter our management of wildfires.6 President 
Barack Obama has proposed a bill that would free up more federal funding for 
wildfire prevention measures by making Congress pay for wildfire suppression 
the same way it pays for natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes.7 
The president’s proposal is well intentioned, but it fails to address the root of 
our wildfire problem: uninhibited expansion into the fire-prone Wildland-
Urban Interface (“WUI”).8 
Given wildfire’s disregard for jurisdictional and political boundaries, the 
management of wildfire is precisely the kind of realm where the federal gov-
ernment should contribute its assistance in conjunction with state police pow-
ers.9 Because the federal government is a substantial holder of fire-prone 
lands, and because of the economic and resource constraints faced by the 
states, federal agencies have assumed most of the responsibility for wildfire 
management.10 Tax dollars have thus been used to protect the property of a 
small, generally wealthy, segment of society in the western United States.11 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Coverage of the Yarnell Hill Fire, AZ CENTRAL, http://www.azcentral.com/news/wildfires/
yarnell/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/44QY-UD8Z (noting that 127 homes 
were burned, and that the hotshots were hand-cutting firebreaks before they were killed). Though the 
loss of life in the Yarnell Hill fire was tragic, the loss of 127 homes is modest compared the 1554 
homes destroyed by Texas’s Bastrop County Complex fire. Will Weissert & Ramit Plushnick-Masti, 
Texas Fire Destroys 1554 Homes, 17 People Missing, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 11, 2011, http://
seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2016175733_apustexaswildfires.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
RC6S-HZRB. The Black Forest wildfire, one of the largest in Colorado history, destroyed 486 homes, 
but was responsible for only two deaths. Sadie Gurman, Black Forest Fire Caused $85 Million in 
Damage to Homes, Assessor Says, DENVER POST, July 9, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_2362
6934/final-count-homes-destroyed-black-forest-fire-is, archived at http://perma.cc/8J3R-UAYJ. 
 4 Siegler, supra note 1. 
 5 See STEPHEN J. PYNE, TENDING FIRE: COPING WITH AMERICA’S WILDLAND FIRES 66 (2004) 
(noting that just a few low-fire years causes public perception of the “fire problem” to fade almost 
completely). 
 6 See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 99–119 and accompanying text (defining the WUI as the area where the bounda-
ries of human development meet and intermix with undeveloped wildlands). 
 9 See Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of Ecology and 
Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 324 (2006) (noting the “boundary-defying” nature of wildfire). 
 10 See infra notes 65–98 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 108–109, 120–121 and accompanying text. 
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The costs of protecting private property in the WUI from wildfire are being 
externalized on the nation, and they are rising at an alarming rate.12 
In today’s interconnected world, some externalities are a fact of life.13 Ex-
ternalities become a problem, however, when they incentivize people to con-
tinue to make economically inefficient decisions because they can externalize 
the costs of those decisions.14 Economists call this “moral hazard.”15 Such a 
problem exists in the present wildfire management regime, because the federal 
government spends heavily to protect private property, which deflates the cost 
of homeowner’s insurance in the WUI to a level that does not reflect the risk of 
living there.16 
To address this problem, this Note advocates for Congress to enact a Na-
tional Wildfire Insurance Program (“NWIP”) to serve as the Nation’s sole pro-
vider of wildfire insurance.17 The proceeds of the program would be used to 
finance the wildfire suppression efforts of federal land management agencies.18 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 99–151 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 
(1967) (noting that “[e]very cost and benefit associated with social interdependence is a potential 
externality”). 
 14 See Christine M. McMillan, Note, Federal Flood Insurance Policy: Making Matters Worse, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 471, 502 (2007) (arguing that the National Flood Insurance Program is a waste of tax 
dollars because subsidized rates encourage rebuilding in high flood-risk zones). 
 15 See Allard E. Dembe & Leslie I. Boden, Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?, 10 NEW 
SOLUTIONS 257, 257 (2000) (explaining that “moral hazard” in the insurance context is used to refer 
to incentives that “increase the risk of insured loss”). 
 16 See infra notes 120–151 and accompanying text. There is thus incentive to reside in the WUI 
because the correlative cost of the actual risk of wildfires is not borne by WUI-residents. See infra 
notes 120–151 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this Note, “actual wildfire risk” accounts 
for the suppression costs incurred by the federal government. 
 17 See infra notes 181–220 and accompanying text. The debate surrounding the costs and benefits 
of wildfire is robust. See Rebecca K. Smith, War on Wildfire: The U.S. Forest Service’s Wildland Fire 
Suppression Policy and Its Legal, Scientific, and Political Context, 15 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 25, 43–
44 (2007) (noting the breadth of opinions on how best to manage fire-prone wildlands). Many policy 
experts and foresters believe that the current system’s prioritization of wildfire suppression over forest 
treatment and management prior to the development of wildfires is deeply flawed. See ROSS GORTE, 
HEADWATERS ECONS., THE RISING COST OF WILDFIRE PROTECTION 2–3 (2013), available at http://
headwaterseconomics.org/wphw/wp-content/uploads/fire-costs-background-report.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/W4GX-PNGF (arguing that the fire suppression policies of the twentieth century are a 
significant cause of the fuel build up in the WUI); Keiter, supra note 9, at 314 (arguing that federal 
fire suppression efforts have distorted the western forests, leaving them “older, denser, and less 
healthy, and thus prone to larger and more intense fires”). Whether the land management agencies 
should redirect suppression efforts towards other forms of forest management is a question to be an-
swered by scientists, and is thus not addressed by this Note. See generally ASHLEY SCHIFF, FIRE AND 
WATER: SCIENTIFIC HERESY IN THE FOREST SERVICE (1962) (arguing that the federal government’s 
undervaluing of forestry science resulted in mismanagement of the Nation’s forests). Instead, this 
Note recognizes the focus on suppression as a reality to be dealt with and presents a new proposal for 
mitigating the growth of wildfire costs. See infra notes 175–177 and accompanying text. As such, this 
Note does not advocate for or against the national policy that focuses heavily on fire suppression. 
 18 See infra notes 188–190 and accompanying text. 
544 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:541 
Further, this Note argues that the decision in National Federation of Independ-
ent Business v. Sebelius to uphold the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (“ACA”) individual mandate provides Congress with a potent tool for 
fighting regional externalities.19 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of wildfire in the United States, 
explains the ecological importance of wildfire, and discusses how the different 
federal and state agencies coordinate to manage wildfire.20 Part II introduces 
the concept of the WUI and discusses how rapid development trends therein 
contribute to rising fire management costs.21 Part II also compares the current 
wildfire management system with the inefficient National Flood Insurance 
Program (“NFIP”).22 Part III argues that Congress should take lessons learned 
from the failures of the NFIP and its newly defined taxing power under Sebe-
lius, to enact the NWIP.23 
Part IV provides an overview of Congress’s taxing power and the ACA 
individual mandate.24 Furthermore, it explains the contours of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sebelius to uphold the individual mandate shared responsi-
bility payment as a constitutionally permissible tax on those who fail to pro-
cure required health insurance.25 Because the proposed NWIP would almost 
certainly be challenged on constitutional grounds, Part VI also addresses po-
tential challenges and argues for why they should fail.26 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 166–221, 284–313 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 27–98 and accompanying text. Most importantly, it explains how funding struc-
tures have given the federal government the most responsibility for wildfire management. See infra 
notes 27–98 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 99–119 and accompanying text. It argues that federal wildfire suppression ef-
forts have distorted the insurance market in the WUI, resulting in insurance premiums that are lower 
than they would be if they accurately reflected the risk of wildfire damage. See infra notes 120–151 
and accompanying text. 
 22 Several scholars and law students have noted the parallels between our wildfire management 
system and the NFIP. See infra notes 120–151 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 166–220 and accompanying text. Unlike the NFIP, this program will not be an 
insurance subsidy; rather it will be modeled on the private insurance system that aims to generate 
revenue. See infra notes 188–197 and accompanying text; see also McMillan, supra note 14, at 486–
87 (noting that historically, when the government enters the insurance business, it “does so for public 
policy reasons, rather than to make a profit,” but that it is not precluded from doing so). 
 24 See infra notes 222–322 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 249–280 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 281–322 and accompanying text. 
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I. WILDFIRE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Ecological Significance of Wildfires 
Wildfires have been a part of natural history since long before humans 
walked the Earth.27 They occur naturally throughout the world, with Antarctica 
being one of the few exceptions, and annually burn an area roughly the size of 
India.28 In the United States, naturally occurring wildfires burn regularly in the 
west, the southeast, and the Great Lakes region.29 For good reason, however, 
the wildfires of the west receive the most attention.30 Western fires are the 
most common and most intense, and therefore pose a greater threat to people 
and property.31 
In areas that have regular, naturally occurring wildfires, the fires actually 
become an integral process within the ecosystem.32 For example, the plants 
that exist today in fire-prone ecosystems have evolved in order to thrive within 
it, a trait called serotiny.33 In the United States, serotiny is most commonly 
found in the pines of the western states, such as the Lodgepole, which regener-
ates from seeds “dropped almost exclusively after . . . fire.”34 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Geologic records suggest that the first wildfires began burning 419 million years ago. PETER A. 
THOMAS & ROBERT S. MCALPINE, FIRE IN THE FOREST 10 (2010). By contrast, the earliest undisput-
ed members of the human family are believed to have existed 2.9 to 3.6 million years ago. Meet Your 
Ancestors, PBS NOVA, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/sciencenow/0303/02-mya-nf.html (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/V5UL-JN48. 
 28 See THOMAS & MCALPINE, supra note 27, at 4. 
 29 See STEPHEN J. PYNE ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO WILDLAND FIRE 267 (2d ed. 1996). Smaller 
fires in the northeast have been reported as well. See Barbara Goldberg, East Coast Wildfires Whipped 
up by Winds, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-usa-
wildfires-idUSBRE8391FU20120410, archived at http://perma.cc/VA66-NCDC. In 2012, wildfires 
burned in New York and New Jersey, where dry conditions and heavy winds led to the burning of 
over 1000 acres. Id. 
 30 See Lauren Wishnie, Student Article, Fire and Federalism, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1006, 1020 
(2008) (noting that the “western states historically have been the most likely to burn”); Andrew 
Freedman, Wildfire Alert Heightens as Blazes Char Western U.S., CLIMATE CENT. (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://www.climatecentral.org/news/wildfire-alert-heightened-as-blazes-char-western-us-16370, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/JGG9-B4R3 (noting that California, Idaho, and Montana have had the high-
est concentration of large fires in recent years). 
 31 See Garrett D. Trego, Note, We Didn’t Start the Fire . . . and We Won’t Pay to Stop It: Financ-
ing Wildfire Management in America’s Wildland-Urban Interface, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. REV. 
595, 600, 605 (2012) (noting that though there are more total homes in the WUIs in the eastern states, 
a “higher percentage of homes in western fire-prone states fall within this designation than the per-
centage of homes in eastern states”). 
 32 See THOMAS & MCALPINE, supra note 27, at 120. 
 33 Stephen J. Pyne, How Plants Use Fire (and Are Used by It), PBS NOVA, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/nova/fire/plants.html (last updated June 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/CKL8-5YM6. For 
example, many pine and hardwood trees in areas where wildfires are common have cones or fruits that 
require fire in order to release their seeds. THOMAS & MCALPINE, supra note 27, at 99. 
 34 THOMAS & MCALPINE, supra note 27, at 106. Some plants that require fire for regeneration 
actually encourage fire by producing flammable resins. CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., 
BENEFITS OF FIRE (2015), available at http://www.fire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/fact_
546 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:541 
The types of wildfires also vary with the ecosystem in which they occur.35 
For example, Ponderosa Pine forests—commonly found in the southwest—
tend to support “high frequency, low intensity fires,” whereas the Lodgepole 
Pine forests of the northern Rocky Mountain region usually experience “infre-
quent, high intensity fires.”36 These fires benefit the individual plant organisms 
through fertilization and seed distribution, but also contribute to an overall 
healthier forest by clearing out aged, sickly trees and removing dead plant 
fuel.37 Most importantly, regular wildfires in forests that are accustomed to 
stand-replacing fires allow such forests to exist as a mosaic of tree stands in 
different stages of life.38 
Although wildfire is a common, natural process on the wildlands of the 
United States, its effect on human population centers can be devastating.39 
Throughout much of our history, wildfire has been thought of as an enemy that 
must be “fought.”40 Because wildfires endanger federal, state, and private 
lands, many different parties have a stake in the creation and implementation 
of a wildfire policy to effectuate this fight.41 As a result, the United States has 
developed a complicated patchwork of wildfire law and policy.42 
B. History of U.S. Wildfire Law and Policy 
Wildfire regulation dates back to 1905, with the establishment of the Bu-
reau of Forestry and later the Forest Service.43 The Forest Service was charged 
with protecting the timber resources and watersheds within the National For-
                                                                                                                           
sheets/TheBenefitsofFire.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7QC5-H6K8. When fire does not enable 
such plants to reproduce, they “eventually succumb to old age with no new generation to carry on.” Id. 
 35 See Keiter, supra note 9, at 314. 
 36 Id. 
 37 CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., supra note 34; THOMAS & MCALPINE, supra note 27, 
at 99. 
 38 This helps prevent unnaturally large and damaging fires and harmful beetle infestations. See 
Joshua Nathaniel, Note, Forests on Fire: The Role of Judicial Oversight, Forest Service Discretion, 
and Environmental Regulations in a Time of Extraordinary Wildfire Danger, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 
923, 927–28 (2007) (noting the biggest problem facing many Lodgepole forests is the lack of age 
diversity, which results in large areas of forest “uniformly declining in vigor”). 
 39 See STEFAN DOERR & CRISTINA SANTIN, LLOYD’S, WILDFIRE: A BURNING ISSUE FOR INSUR-
ERS? 20 (2013) (noting that since 1990, wildfire has cost California over $8 billion in private property 
loss). 
 40 Smith, supra note 17, at 43. 
 41 See Karen M. Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 
445, 451–52 (2010) (noting that wildfire affects groups with inconsistent land use goals and corre-
spondingly “variant interests in defining ideal wildfire outcomes”). 
 42 See Keiter, supra note 9, at 358–59 (noting that because “both federal and state law are ger-
mane to fire management policy . . . a pastiche of laws and policies governing wildfire on the public 
lands” is created). 
 43 PYNE ET AL., supra note 29, at 246–47. Keiter, supra note 9, at 305. 
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ests.44 Consequently, it viewed wildfire as a “significant threat to its mis-
sion.”45 Forest Service officers were charged with informing western settlers—
who used fire to clear land and promote soil fertility—that the Forest Service 
would protect its timberland holdings with all legal means at its disposal.46 The 
nascent Forest Service’s opposition to wildfires, however, remained primarily 
rhetorical until a particularly intense fire season in the summer of 1910.47 The 
Great Burn of 1910 killed eighty-five people, burned three million acres, and 
became infamous in fire history and lore.48 Further, it “became a focal point 
for political action that dramatically affected wildfire suppression throughout 
the [twentieth] century.”49 In response to the Forest Service adopted a policy of 
total wildfire suppression—a policy that has changed the face of America’s 
forests dramatically.50 
After the summer of 1910, the Forest Service actively fought all fires, re-
gardless of the source, and even suppressed research efforts to examine wheth-
er fire might play a necessary role in preserving forest health.51 The creation of 
the Civilian Conservation Corps as part of the New Deal provided the Forest 
Service with a firefighting force, which allowed it to expand its war on fire 
further into the wilderness.52 After the Second World War, the Forest Service 
buttressed its firefighting programs with the addition of surplus military air-
planes and other heavy machinery.53 It was also during this time that it institut-
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. at 247. 
 45 Keiter, supra note 9, at 305. 
 46 Id. at 306. The Forest Service’s initial charter outlined the legal provisions that it could employ 
to punish “malice or carelessness with fires.” GIFFORD PINCHOT, FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., THE USE OF THE NATIONAL FOREST RESERVES: REGULATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS 67 
(1905), available at http://www.foresthistory.org/aspnet/publications/1905_use_book/1905_use_book.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WAY6-8TVU. They included fines and imprisonment for those who 
failed to extinguish the fires they set. Id. The charter also declared that the federal government may 
“bring civil action to recover damages caused by fire, no matter how it was set” and regardless of 
where the fire was set or if negligence was displayed. Id. 
 47 See Keiter, supra note 9, at 306 (noting that prior to the fires of 1910, the Forest Service tacitly 
recognized the ways that wildfire could benefit the environment as well as the ways it could be put to 
beneficial human use). 
 48 Dean Lueck, Economics and the Organization of Wildfire Suppression, in WILDFIRE POLICY: 
LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES 71, 72 (Karen M. Bradshaw & Dean Lueck eds., 2012). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Keiter, supra note 9, at 306, 314. 
 51 See id. at 306–07. See generally SCHIFF, supra note 17 (arguing that administrators of the early 
Forest Service viewed their role as crusaders against wildfire and undervalued scientific research of 
the ecological importance of fire). Schiff notes that the Forest Service failed to release internal re-
search that promoted prescribed burning as a sound management tool. Id. at 168. He claims that the 
Forest Service suppressed the findings, in part, because it would be an embarrassing affront to their 
crusade against fire. See id. 
 52 Keiter, supra note 9, at 307. 
 53 Id. 
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ed the Smokey the Bear fire prevention campaign and Walt Disney chipped in 
with anti-fire messaging in the film Bambi.54 
As the wilderness movement gained momentum in the 1960s, the public’s 
attitude began to shift “toward minimizing human intrusions in undeveloped 
public lands, whether for firefighting or other purposes.”55 Further, a scientific 
consensus that fire played a necessary ecological role began to emerge.56 The 
federal land management agencies performed an about-face and began allow-
ing natural wildfires to burn when they “promoted wildlife or vegetation man-
agement objectives.”57 They even employed human-ignited “prescribed fires” 
to mimic natural fires on lands that had been distorted by past suppression ef-
forts.58 The emergence of this progressive management scheme, however, was 
thwarted by the popular backlash following the 1988 Yellowstone fires that 
grew out of control.59 
Although federal land management agencies have officially recognized 
the ecological importance of fire, and even endorsed the use of prescribed fire, 
the use of fire as a land management tool has been tempered by the fact that 
federal agencies must coordinate with local and state officials who are more 
fire averse because of the threat it poses to their constituents.60 As a result of 
decades of aggressive suppression policies, our Nation’s forests are severely 
unhealthy.61 More than seventy million acres of federal lands are at a high risk 
for wildfire.62 This increase in fire risk is attributable, in large part, to unnatu-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See THOMAS & MCALPINE, supra note 27, at 20–21 (noting that Smokey the Bear and Bambi 
were instrumental in “instilling concern about unwanted fire in many Americans”). In the Disney 
classic, the hunters that killed Bambi’s mother were also responsible for setting the forest ablaze by 
failing to tend to their campfire. Id. at 20. A terrified Bambi is nearly engulfed in the flames before 
being saved by his father. Id. Steven Pyne has noted that the original story of Bambi makes no men-
tion of a forest fire; rather the fire was added for American audiences and sent a powerful anti-fire 
message to children. PYNE, TENDING FIRE: COPING WITH AMERICA’S WILDLAND FIRES, supra note 5, 
at 56. 
 55 Keiter, supra note 9, at 308. 
 56 Id. at 307. 
 57 Id. at 308. 
 58 STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND RURAL FIRE 
303–04 (1982) [hereinafter PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA]. 
 59 See Keiter, supra note 9, at 309. The 1988 Yellowstone fires burned more that 1.5 million 
acres. Id. Despite the growing recognition that fires are a natural ecological process, local politicians 
considered the fire a tragedy due to the loss of the summer tourist season and because the Park’s ver-
dant forests were largely charred. Id. More significantly, the Yellowstone fires caused outrage in local 
communities that were jeopardized by the blaze, highlighting the conflict between the ecological ben-
efits of fire and the interests of private landowners. Id. 
 60 See id. at 310. 
 61 See SARA E. JENSEN & GUY R. MCPHERSON, LIVING WITH FIRE: FIRE ECOLOGY AND POLICY 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 61–71 (2008). 
 62 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR ET AL., REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE 
MANAGEMENT POLICY 8 (2001), available at https://www.nifc.gov/PIO_bb/Policy/FederalWildland
FireManagementPolicy_2001.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/HS37-PD4P. The federal government 
is responsible for managing 415 million acres of fire-adapted land. Id. at 7. It classifies these lands as 
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ral fuel accumulation as a result of the decades of suppression efforts.63 To 
complicate the matter, more and more Americans are living in the direct path 
of these fires.64 
C. The Organization of Wildfire Planning and Management 
The management of wildfires is defined by organizational complexity.65 
Federal, state, and local agencies all have responsibilities when it comes to fire 
planning and management.66 Nevertheless, the Forest Service remains the pri-
mary entity responsible for the development and implementation of wildfire 
policies.67 This is due, in large part, to the agency’s access to “virtually unlim-
ited emergency funding for suppression.”68 State agencies, on the other hand, 
have fixed budgets and generally are unable to employ deficit spending for 
emergency activities.69 
When a fire is first reported, the firefighters from the affected administra-
tive unit are generally the first to respond.70 For example, when a wildfire 
breaks out in a national forest, the rangers and firefighting corps of that Na-
tional Forest District will respond.71 It is common for the fire management 
scheme to take on an interagency character as firefighters from nearby jurisdic-
tions contribute resources in the form of direct suppression efforts or by buffer-
ing their own land from the spreading fire.72 If the regional resources prove to 
                                                                                                                           
Class 1, 2 and 3. Id. Class 1 lands are lands where “human activity has not significantly altered histor-
ical fire regimes . . . . These areas usually pose relatively low public safety and ecological risks.” Id. 
On the other end of the spectrum are the 70 million acres of Class 3 lands, which pose risks to public 
safety, economies, and natural resources due to the fact that “[s]everal fire return intervals have been 
missed, resulting in considerable accumulation of live and dead fuels, increasing the potential for 
high-severity fires.” Id. at 8. 
 63 Keiter, supra note 9, at 311. 
 64 See Trego, supra note 31, at 605–06. 
 65 See Lueck, supra note 48, at 71 (noting that the suppression efforts for large fires resembles “a 
military-style hierarchical organization”); Wishnie, supra note 30, at 1015; see also DOERR & SAN-
TIN, supra note 39, at 24–25 (noting the various regulations in the United States that differ state by 
state). 
 66 Wishnie, supra note 30, at 1015. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 PYNE ET AL., supra note 29, at 433. In fact, one scholar has called fire management the Forest 
Service’s raison d’être, as today’s firefighting programs “contribute . . . more to the agency’s budget 
than timber ever did.” RANDAL O’TOOLE, CATO INST., THE PERFECT FIRESTORM: BRINGING FOREST 
SERVICE WILDFIRE COSTS UNDER CONTROL 5 (2007), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.
org/files/pubs/pdf/pa591.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YY2Q-4QRE. 
 70 Wishnie, supra note 30, at 1019 (noting that some states have agreements with the federal 
government that allow the closest firefighting forces to make the initial response regardless of whether 
the fire started within their jurisdiction). 
 71 See id. 
 72 Id. 
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be insufficient to manage the fire,73 the National Interagency Coordination 
Center (“NICC”) assumes management of fire suppression resources.74 The 
cooperative structure means “federal resources are also drawn into action when 
fire breaks out on state or private land.”75 Though there are a multitude of fire-
fighting bodies, the “Forest Service continues to play a dominant role even 
within these cooperative management structures.”76 
The federal agencies have articulated that in suppressing wildfires, their 
first priority is protecting human life and that the prioritization of protecting 
other property and resources will be “based on the values to be protected, hu-
man health and safety, and the costs of protection.”77 Though federal wildfire 
policy considers private and public property to be of equal priority, behind 
human life, the “political reality is that protecting people’s homes is given pri-
ority over protecting lands and resources.”78 Opponents of this view note that it 
can lead to massive economic inefficiencies.79 These scholars often cite the 
fact that prioritizing structures can lead to anomalous results, such as hundreds 
of acres of economically viable timberland being “allowed to burn to save a 
single, unoccupied home.”80 These inefficiencies are further exacerbated by 
funding structures in which the federal government provides a backstop for the 
state and regional fire managers.81 
Congress’s “blank-check” policy has put too much emphasis on fire sup-
pression at the expense of prevention and mitigation efforts.82 Furthermore, 
state level fire managers are incentivized to protect their budgets by accepting 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) aid when possible.83 If a 
wildfire that starts on non-federal land grows large enough, FEMA may desig-
                                                                                                                           
 73 The NICC has divided the Nation’s state and federal firefighting resources into eleven regions. 
Id. When a region requires additional assistance, the NICC can deploy air tankers, smoke jumpers, 
and other firefighting personnel from all over the country. Id. at 1019–20. 
 74 Id. The NICC is housed within the National Interagency Fire Center (“NIFC”). About Us, 
NAT’L INTERAGENCY COORDINATION CTR., http://www.nifc.gov/nicc/about/about.htm (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/L5QK-UCT6. The NIFC, based in Boise, Idaho, acts as 
“the nation’s support center for wildland firefighting.” Welcome to the Nation’s Logistical Support 
Center, NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., http://www.nifc.gov/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/M2F7-SQCR. 
 75 Wishnie, supra note 30, at 1020. 
 76 Id. 
 77 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 62, at 23. 
 78 GORTE, supra note 17, at 7. 
 79 See generally WILDFIRE POLICY: LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 48 and 
accompanying text (discussing in detail how the current wildfire policy framework leads to resource 
waste). 
 80 Bradshaw, supra note 41, at 456. 
 81 See infra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
 82 See O’TOOLE, supra note 69, at 1–5 (arguing that Congress’s “blank check” policy for wildfire 
suppression must be ended in order to control the rising cost of wildfire). 
 83 See Trego, supra note 31, at 613. 
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nate it to be a “threat of major disaster.”84 Under such circumstances, states can 
seek federal assistance with fire suppression costs through the Fire Manage-
ment Assistance Grant Program.85 Through this program, FEMA pays for sev-
enty-five percent of a state’s wildfire suppression costs.86 This provides state 
fire managers with the perverse incentive to allow minor fires to become full-
on conflagrations in order to obtain substantial funding for the suppression 
efforts.87 Once the state has reached the threshold amount of expenditures on 
fire suppression, it can apply for the grant.88 According to FEMA, “the entire 
process is accomplished on an expedited basis and a FEMA decision is ren-
dered in a matter of hours.”89 Some western governors have publicly stated 
their desire for all wildfires to be treated as emergencies, putting pressure on 
state agency heads to procure federal funding through such an avenue.90 
In addition to being on the hook for a substantial portion of the costs of 
wildfire on state lands, the federal government is also responsible for suppres-
sion costs on federal lands, particularly in the western states, where the federal 
government is the largest single landholder.91 As a result, the federal govern-
ment pays for the vast majority of all wildfire suppression efforts, yet Congress 
has continued to reaffirm and fund these programs because it views fire “as a 
boundary-defying natural force with large-scale destructive potential.”92 
In his 2015 budget proposal, President Barack Obama has proposed a sig-
nificant overhaul in how the federal government pays for wildfire manage-
ment.93 The President proposed that the federal government pay for wildfire 
suppression in the same manner that it does for hurricanes, tornadoes, and oth-
er natural disasters.94 For example, when a disaster such as a hurricane is de-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Fire Management Assistance Grant Program, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/fire-management-
assistance-grant-program (last updated Feb. 6, 2015, 1:53 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/VW9U-
5PTC. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Bradshaw, supra note 41, at 459–60 (noting that fire managers have the incentive to let 
containable fires grow into “campaign fire” conflagrations that attract media attention and federal aid). 
 88 Fire Management Assistance Grant Program, supra note 84. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Rocky Barker, FLAME Act Fails to Curb Fires: Lawmakers Say Fuel Reduction Must Be a 
Priority, IDAHO STATESMAN (Aug. 28, 2013), http://archives.mtexpress.com/index2.php?ID=2007
147772&var_Year=2013&var_Month=08&var_Day=28#.VNDXEGTF_NU, archived at http://perma.
cc/7KW9-64DT. 
 91 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text; see also Sam A. Snyder, Geothermal Sales 
Contracts, 5A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13 (1977) (noting that the federal government is the pre-
dominant landholder in the western states). 
 92 Keiter, supra note 9, at 324. 
 93 Coral Davenport, Obama to Propose Shift in Wildfire Funding, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2014, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/us/obama-to-propose-shift-in-wildfire-funding.html
?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/VUQ6-7XKB. 
 94 Id. 
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structive enough to be declared an emergency, FEMA is “authorized to exceed 
its annual budget and draw on a special disaster account.”95 President Obama 
proposed that such an exception be made for the Departments of the Interior 
and of Agriculture, which oversee the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 
and the Forest Service, respectively.96 The point of the proposal is to protect 
the BLM’s and the Forest Service’s resources from being commandeered for 
suppression efforts rather than fire prevention efforts, their intended use.97 If 
the President’s proposal is enacted, it may provide the BLM and the Forest 
Service with more resources to prevent fires, but it will not address the prob-
lem of WUI residents not paying their fair share for wildfire management.98 
II. FEDERAL WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION: A SUBSIDY FOR PEOPLE LIVING IN 
THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE 
A. The Rising Costs of Wildfires and the Development of the  
Wildland-Urban Interface 
The federal government is spending more and more each year on wildfire 
management; in the 1990s, it spent under $1 billion annually to manage wild-
fires, but that number has ballooned in recent years.99 Since 2002, annual federal 
funding for wildfire protection has averaged $3.1 billion.100 Of this amount, 
roughly seventy percent goes to the Forest Service and thirty percent to the De-
partment of the Interior (“DOI”).101 The tripling of federal fire protection ex-
penses is partly due to the more severe fire seasons—six of the worst fire sea-
sons in the last fifty years have occurred in the last decade102—but it is also due 
to the increasing development of the Wildland-Urban Interface (“WUI”).103 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.; see Bureaus & Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/bureaus/index.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5RAL-9FWK (noting that the BLM is con-
tained within the Department of the Interior); USDA Agencies and Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navtype=MA&navid=AGENCIES_OFFICES (last 
modified Feb. 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FZ7Z-RKRT (noting that the Forest Service is 
contained within the Department of Agriculture). 
 97 See Davenport, supra note 93. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack said, “[w]hen you take 
resources to suppress fires, you sometimes have to take [them] from the very resources that you would 
use to restore property or to prevent fires to begin with[,] . . . . [a]nd that just basically shifts the risk to 
a much longer-term and more serious risk.” Id. 
 98 See infra notes 99–151 and accompanying text. 
 99 See GORTE, supra note 17, at 4 (noting that from 1991 to 1999, the Forest Service and the 
Department of the Interior averaged $0.92 billion in annual wildfire protection appropriations). 
 100 Id. at 14. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See id. at 2, 14. 
 103 See Jamison Colburn, The Fire Next Time: Land Use Planning in the Wildland/Urban Inter-
face, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 223, 239 (2008) (arguing that the more people desire to 
live near what remains of our “wild” lands, the greater the cost to society). 
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The WUI, as defined by the Forest Service, includes areas “where struc-
tures and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped 
wildlands.”104 The term is a bit of a misnomer because the WUI contains popu-
lation densities far lower than what is typically considered urban.105 In fact, in 
the western states, “on average 3.2 acres per person are consumed for housing 
in the wildland-urban interface, compared to 0.5 acres per person on other 
western private lands.”106 This low density makes the homes of the WUI hard-
er to protect from fire.107 Furthermore, homes in the WUI are far more likely to 
be second homes.108 In the rest of the privately held lands of the west, only one 
in twenty-five homes is a second home.109 
Ninety-one percent of the federal appropriations for wildfire management 
are allocated for the use of protecting federal lands,110 but there is evidence 
that the existence of private homes and other structures “adjacent to federal 
lands can significantly alter fire control strategies and raise costs.”111 Although 
federal wildfire suppression policy “explicitly states that protecting human 
lives is the priority, and that protecting private property and natural resources 
are equal as the second priority . . . the political reality is that protecting peo-
ple’s homes is given priority over protecting lands and resources.”112 When a 
fire breaks out on federal lands with adjacent private structures, fire managers 
often deploy firebreaks and costly firefighting aircraft to protect the struc-
tures.113 In a survey by the U.S. Inspector General, some Forest Service land 
managers estimated that “[fifty] to [ninety-five] percent of firefighting costs 
were attributable to protection of private property.”114 
                                                                                                                           
 104 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT: FOREST SERVICE 
LARGE FIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS, at i n.1 (2006), available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/
08601-44-SF.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9YDE-LS2P; see also Urban Wildland Interface Com-
munities Within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That Are at High Risk from Wildfire, 66 Fed. Reg. 752, 
753 (Dep’t of Agric. Jan. 4, 2001) (notices) (defining the WUI as “where humans and their develop-
ment meet or intermix with wildland fuel”). 
 105 HEADWATERS ECONS., SOLUTIONS TO THE RISING COSTS OF FIGHTING FIRES IN THE 
WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE 5 (2009), available at http://headwaterseconomics.org/wphw/wp-
content/uploads/HeadwatersFireCosts.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/45TW-GLVU. 
 106 Id. at 55. 
 107 See id. at 56 (noting that it is easier to protect a single subdivision than the same number of 
homes spread out over a larger tract of land). 
 108 Id. at 5. Only four percent of homes in the west are in the WUI and one in five of those homes 
is a second home. Id. at 11. 
 109 Id. at 11. 
 110 GORTE, supra note 17 at 14. 
 111 Id. at 7. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See id. (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra 104, at ii). A study conducted for the Mon-
tana legislature found that firefighting costs are “highly correlated with the number of homes threatened.” 
HEADWATERS ECONS., MONTANA WILDFIRE COST STUDY TECHNICAL REPORT 18 (2008), available at 
http://headwaterseconomics.org/wphw/wp-content/uploads/HeadwatersEconomics_FireCostStudy_
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Perhaps the most important feature of the WUI is its potential for further 
development.115 At present, just fourteen percent of the forested private land 
adjacent to public land is developed, “leaving tremendous potential for future 
development on the remaining [eighty-six] percent.”116 In fact, the WUI has 
been developed at such a rapid pace during the last decade that it is “the fastest 
growing category of real estate in America.”117 To complicate these issues fur-
ther, global warming may mandate significant increases in the already vast 
amount of federal money currently being spent on wildfire management.118 
Thus, fire economics experts have stated that “[t]he rising cost of wildland 
firefighting will not be controlled without also influencing the pace, scale, and 
pattern of residential development in the wildland-urban interface.”119 
B. Government Subsidized Firefighting and Its Distortion of the Markets for 
Fire Insurance: A Comparison with the  
National Flood Insurance Program 
Billions of tax dollars are spent each year fighting wildfires that endanger 
private property in the WUI, despite the fact that a small, predominantly wealthy 
population lives in such areas.120 The federal government’s fire policy is essen-
tially subsidizing the desired mountain lifestyle of America’s wealthy.121 Be-
                                                                                                                           
TechnicalReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D7U5-BBUA; see also PATRICIA H. GUDE ET AL., 
HEADWATERS ECONS., EVIDENCE FOR THE EFFECT OF HOMES ON WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS 14 
(2011), available at http://headwaterseconomics.org/wphw/wp-content/uploads/CAfire_Manuscript_
July11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y9CB-R3AY (finding the same in a similar study conducted in 
California). 
 115 HEADWATERS ECONS., SOLUTIONS TO THE RISING COSTS OF FIGHTING FIRES IN THE 
WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE, supra note 105, at 5. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Colburn, supra note 103, at 240. 
 118 See generally CLIMATE CENTRAL, THE AGE OF WESTERN WILDFIRES (2012) (explaining that 
rising global temperatures contribute to longer and more extreme wildfire seasons in the western Unit-
ed States). 
 119 HEADWATERS ECONS., SOLUTIONS TO THE RISING COSTS OF FIGHTING FIRES IN THE 
WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE, supra note 105, at 8. 
 120 See id. at 5. (highlighting the disproportionately large percentage of second homes in the 
WUI). 
 121 See GORTE, supra note 17 at 4, 11 (noting that more people are moving to the WUI because 
“[b]eautiful scenery, a forested setting, nearby wildlife, and relative isolation from neighbors are in-
creasingly desired for private homes” and they do not have to bare the cost of wildfire protection); 
Wishnie, supra note 30, at 1020 (arguing that, through its wildfire management policies, “the federal 
government is, to a significant extent, subsidizing the western states and subsidizing landowners who 
choose to live in highly fire-prone areas”). Western mountain towns like Ketchum, Idaho rely on visi-
tors and second-home owners for their economic wellbeing. See Barker, supra note 90. The increasing 
intensity of wildfire seasons can disrupt “critical summer tourism” in these towns, and “give owners 
of recreation homes second thoughts.” Id. As a result, many western lawmakers have endorsed wild-
fire suppression and prevention policies. See id. (quoting Ketchum mayor, Randy Hall as saying that 
“the second-home owners are getting tired [of recurring wildfires]”). 
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cause people have come to see the Forest Service’s fighting of wildfires as a 
guarantee, private insurance companies offer policies with premiums that do not 
reflect the actual risk of living in the WUI.122 
The costs of wildfire protection incurred by the federal government each 
year represent a major economic inefficiency and recently, these costs have 
begun to receive more attention from economists and legal scholars.123 Ac-
cording to one such scholar, Carolyn Kousky, “public suppression activity is 
an implicit subsidy, driving a wedge between private benefits and costs in 
household and firm location decisions” that incentivizes development in fire-
prone areas.124 Dean Lueck, an economist and wildfire policy expert, notes that 
the organizational complexity of our wildfire management scheme has incen-
tivized suppression crews and both public and private landowners to make 
economically inefficient choices.125 Lueck notes that the “rule-based bureau-
cratic structure of suppression organizations, [and] the emergency status of fire 
suppression in law and policy” result in the vast overprotection of structures.126 
In fact, the federal government’s 2003 budget stated that, “[i]n some western 
areas, the government pays more in suppressing fires than the fair market value 
of the structures threatened by those fires. It would literally be cheaper to let 
them burn and pay 100 percent of the rebuilding cost.”127 
 Casting our wildfire management policy in such stark economic terms 
suggests that the system is indefensible. This Note, however, argues that some 
inefficiencies in our firefighting regime are inevitable.128 Our wildfire suppres-
sion policies are deeply entrenched and it is unlikely that there will ever be the 
political will to set a policy that lets homes burn because it makes economic 
“sense.”129 Instead, this Note proposes that federal firefighting agencies con-
tinue to protect the people and the homes of the WUI, but that the federal gov-
ernment take steps to ensure that a fair share of the costs of the protection are 
borne by those who reap the benefits.130  
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Bradshaw, supra note 41, at 462 (noting that homeowners in the WUI have the ability “to 
receive full insurance at a rate not reflective of the entire risk assumed”). 
 123 See generally WILDFIRE POLICY: LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 48 (repre-
senting the “first coordinated effort by top legal scholars and economists” to address the policy di-
lemma posed by wildfires). 
 124 Carolyn Kousky et al., In Harm’s Way: Homeowner Behavior and Wildland Fire Policy, in 
WILDFIRE POLICY: LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 48, at 178, 180. 
 125 See Lueck, supra note 48, at 83 (noting that the regime encourages development in fire-prone 
lands and fire suppression techniques that are unnecessarily costly). 
 126 Id.; see also supra notes 10–81 and accompanying text (illustrating the background of U.S. 
federal fire suppression policy). 
 127 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET 
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 66 (2002). 
 128 See infra notes 166–180 and accompanying text. 
 129 See supra notes 78, 112, 122 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 166–220 and accompanying text. 
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Recent scholarship regarding the implicit subsidy that the government 
provides for residents of the WUI has drawn parallels between federals spend-
ing on fire suppression and the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”).131 
The NFIP was enacted in 1968 with the intention of reducing the costs of fed-
eral disaster relief provided to communities that suffer flooding events.132 Due 
to the high risk and the seasonal nature of flooding, insurance companies were 
unable to offer affordable flood insurance coverage.133 Consequently, many 
floodplain residents were forced to go uninsured, and the federal government 
ended up being saddled with massive disaster assistance costs after large 
floods.134 
The NFIP, which is administered by Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (“FEMA”), provides flood insurance only to communities that agree to 
regulate development in flood-prone areas according to federal require-
ments.135 Although land use regulation is traditionally reserved to the states, 
the National Flood Insurance Act, which created the NFIP, transfers to Con-
gress land-use planning control in communities that participate in the NFIP.136 
As part of the NFIP, FEMA maps flood hazard zones.137 It uses these mapping 
projects to assess risk of future flooding and conducts actuarial studies to set 
premium rates for newly issued policies.138 Although new construction in 
communities that have joined the NFIP is subject to the higher risk-based rates, 
“the original, subsidized policyholders retain the subsidized rate.”139 
Detractors of the NFIP—an explicit insurance subsidy for those living in 
the Nation’s most flood-prone areas—argue that the plan encourages irrespon-
sible behavior by subsidizing the costs of building and rebuilding in locations 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See Colburn, supra note 103, at 242–43 (drawing parallels between the inefficiencies of the 
NFIP and the current wildfire management regime); Trego, supra note 31, at 616–17 (noting the same 
inefficiencies as Colburn). 
 132 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL FLOOD IN-
SURANCE PROGRAM: ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NFIP 1 (2011), available at http://www.
fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1438-20490-1905/f084_atq_11aug11.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/79CP-RJNW. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 McMillan, supra note 14, at 481. 
 136 Id. at 478–79. For example, FEMA must approve a community’s building code regulations 
before it can enter the program, thus allowing its residents procure flood insurance. Id. at 481. By 
setting zoning requirements, the federal government intended to mitigate the damages to property that 
would occur as a result of future flooding events. Id. For example, new homes built in the 100-year 
floodplain are required to use certain construction techniques that make them more resistant to flood 
damage. See id. at 501. 
 137 Id. at 480. 
 138 Id. at 482. 
 139 Id. 
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that will continue to flood repeatedly.140 They point to the $24 billion in debt 
amassed by the NFIP, which has resulted from the program’s years of charging 
actuarially unsound premiums, and the perverse incentive for homeowners to 
rebuild in harm’s way.141 
The NFIP’s large debt has led many to criticize the program for creating a 
moral hazard and the political pressure to reform the NFIP has been intense.142 
In July 2012, reformers succeeded in passing the Biggert-Waters Flood Insur-
ance Reform Act (“BWFIRA”).143 As a large reworking of the NFIP, the 
BWFIRA was designed to phase out the current insurance subsidies for proper-
ties in designated flood zones.144 Recently, however, it was substantially modi-
fied by the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (the 
“HFIAA”).145 The HFIAA gradually phases in actuarially sound premiums for 
properties newly included in the 100 year flood map, but reinstates the subsidies 
for properties that were included in the map when the NFIP was created.146 
At present, the federal government does not directly subsidize wildfire in-
surance in the way it does flood insurance.147 The availability of wildfire in-
surance, however, will become decreasingly available, “creating a large burden 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See generally McMillan, supra note 14 (arguing that the NFIP is not only bad policy, but that 
its encouragement of rebuilding in harm’s way is negligent); John Stossel, Taxpayers Get Soaked by 
Government’s Flood Insurance, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/
Insurance/story?id=94181&singlePage=true, archived at http://perma.cc/7QM9-PN9G (offering a 
personal anecdote that supports the notion that the NFIP encourages rebuilding after flood damage). 
 141 See CAROLYN KOUSKY & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, WHARTON CTR. FOR RISK MGMT. & DE-
CISION PROCESSES, ADDRESSING AFFORDABILITY IN THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
MEANS-TESTED VOUCHERS COUPLED WITH MITIGATION LOANS (2013), available at http://opim.
wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/WRCib2013d_Affordability_NFIP.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
FAK8-DN2F. 
 142 See Logan Strother, Insuring Risk: National Flood Insurance Policy & Moral Hazard, DISAS-
TERS, PROP. & POLITICS (Jan. 23, 2014), http://disasterspropertypolitics.com/2014/01/23/insuring-
risk-national-flood-insurance-policy-moral-hazard/, archived at http://perma.cc/GCK6-3DQE (argu-
ing that by making insurance more affordable in flood-prone regions, the federal government has 
actually “contributed to the concentration of people and capital in flood-prone areas”). See generally 
Louis Cruz, Note, Examining Current Proposals for Increasing the Federal Role in Dealing with 
Coastal Hurricane Risk, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 323 (2009) (outlining the numerous proposed reforms to 
the NFIP). 
 143 Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 (2012)) (repealed 2014). The BWFIRA is the rare 
law that “traditionally conservative free-market groups and traditionally progressive environmental 
groups supported enthusiastically.” Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: Smartersafer.org and the Biggert-
Waters Act of 2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 351, 351 (2013). 
 144 Lehrer, supra note 143, at 352. 
 145 Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4005, 4015a, 4033, 
4101d, 4101e. 
 146 Dan Farber, Sea Levels Rise, Premiums Not So Much, LEGAL PLANET (Mar. 24, 2014) 
http://legal-planet.org/2014/03/24/sea-level-rises-premiums-not-so-much/, archived at http://perma.
cc/3TZS-L6RY. 
 147 See Kousky et al., supra note 124, at 191–92. 
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on the states.”148 If and when this happens, the federal government will likely 
be called on to intervene, perhaps with a plan modeled after the NFIP.149 In 
fact, California has already enacted a program that requires insurers in the state 
to join the “state-regulated association that acts as an insurer of last resort, 
providing property insurance to homeowners who cannot obtain insurance in 
the private market, and offering it at generally subsidized rates.”150 One critic 
of this policy argues that it creates a moral hazard because it “significantly un-
derprices wildfire risk in California and encourages development in the most 
hazardous areas.”151 
C. The Problem of Cost Shifting in the Healthcare Market and the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Individual Mandate 
 The problem of cost shifting seen in the wildfire management and flood 
insurance contexts has existed in the Nation’s health care market for the last 
several decades.152 In 1986, President Regan signed into law the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”).153 The EMTALA re-
quired all hospitals receiving Medicaid funding to offer emergency care to any 
patient that walks through the door, regardless of their ability to pay.154 
“Though EMTALA embodied a progressive notion of healthcare that ensured 
that no one would be denied emergency care due to lack of insurance, it was an 
unfunded mandate.”155 As a result, a “free-rider” problem was created: unin-
sured individuals could receive free care by shifting costs to individuals.156 
 It is estimated that the health care system was obliged to provide more 
than $43 billion in uncompensated medical care each year, as a result of EM-
TALA.157 “These costs [were] passed on to insurers in the form of higher med-
ical bills for the insured populations, and insurers, in turn, [passed the] costs on 
to the insured population in the form of higher premiums.”158 Further, govern-
ment programs that absorb the cost of providing critical care to the uninsured 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. 
 150 ROGER G. KENNEDY, WILDFIRE AND AMERICANS: HOW TO SAVE LIVES, PROPERTY, AND 
YOUR TAX DOLLARS 243 (2006). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE 
2–4 (2013). 
 153 Id. at 2. 
 154 Id. 
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pass costs on to the taxpayers in the form of higher taxes.159 One of the goals 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was to reduce the 
cost of health insurance by eliminating this cost shifting.160 In order to combat 
the cross-subsidization problem, the ACA requires that all individuals sign up 
for at least a minimum level of health insurance.161 Individuals who fail to 
comply with what is known as the individual mandate are forced to pay a pen-
alty—a “shared responsibility payment”—to the federal government.162  
Though the shifted costs of wildfire suppression pale in comparison to 
those seen in healthcare,163 the cost of wildfire management is predicted to 
increase exponentially as more land in the WUI is settled and climate change 
creates a more fire-prone landscape in the west.164 It is time to take action to 
mitigate the moral hazard problem created by development in the WUI.165 
III. A NEW APPROACH TO WILDFIRE INSURANCE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
THE NFIP AND THE ACA INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
The lessons learned from the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) 
are instructive in considering a new approach to rein in wildfire management 
costs.166 Although fire insurance remains available—and is, in most cases, 
cheaper than it should be under pure market valuation167—it is possible that 
insurance providers will start dropping fire insurance coverage in the Nation’s 
more fire-prone areas.168 Congress should take this opportunity to prevent a 
situation where it is pressured to subsidize fire insurance across the west, like 
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it was with flood insurance.169 In so doing, it should endeavor to alter the wild-
fire insurance market to ensure costs reflect actual wildfire risk.170 
Academics and policy experts have long called for the federal govern-
ment to create a national fire policy that focuses on returning fire to its natural, 
ecological role and reining in excessive spending on wildfire suppression.171 
Nevertheless, for decades, the government has ignored the calls to articulate an 
overarching fire policy.172 Although we can neither eliminate fires or the risk 
they pose to people and property,173 the academic and policy consensus is that 
the current framework will cause wildfire costs incurred by the federal gov-
ernment to grow at exponential rates.174 
This Note does not advocate for or against federal agency policies that fo-
cus most resources on wildfire suppression rather than pre-treatment of fire-
prone forests. Instead, it recognizes that those policies are deeply entrenched 
and likely to remain substantially the same for the foreseeable future.175 As 
such, it proposes that Congress enact a National Wildfire Insurance Program 
(“NWIP”) to shift wildfire suppression costs to those who benefit most directly 
from the current status quo, while disincentivizing the rapid development of 
the Wildland-Urban Interface (“WUI”).176 A NWIP can, and should, be 
achieved through federal legislation.177 
Making those who own homes in the WUI pay for fire suppression based 
on the actual risk they assume will have a number of positive consequences. It 
will disincentivize to further development in the WUI,178 and those who do 
take the risk of building in the WUI will be forced to help fund the govern-
ment’s suppression policies.179 Further, WUI residents will be incentivized to 
reduce the risk of fire on their property in order to reduce their insurance 
costs.180  
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The federal government should enact a NWIP, whereby it would be the 
sole insurer of wildfire loss.181 Congress has already preempted the field of 
private flood insurance with the NFIP, and its ability to regulate insurance un-
der its commerce power is plenary.182 Thus, Congress has the power to prevent 
private insurers from underwriting wildfire loss.183 A NWIP could be modeled 
after the NFIP.184 For example, like the NFIP, the NWIP could be administered 
by Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”).185 Unlike the NFIP, 
however, the NWIP would not offer any type of insurance subsidies.186 Quite 
the contrary, the goals of the NWIP would be to reestablish market forces on 
property development in the WUI that reflect the risk of wildfire, to fund wild-
fire management with the premiums paid by the residents of the WUI, and to 
incentivize property management practices that mitigate wildfire risk.187 
A. Actuarially Sound Premiums 
Unlike the premiums charged in the NFIP, the federal government should, 
in the proposed WFIP, charge actuarially sound premiums for wildfire insur-
ance.188 To accomplish this, the government would reflect its wildfire suppres-
sion costs in the premiums of the policies it issues.189 The ultimate goal would 
be for the program to turn a profit in line with the expected wildfire suppres-
sion budgets of the federal wildland agencies.190 Under this plan, Congress 
would use a “homeowner mandate” that requires those living in wildfire-prone 
areas to purchase federal wildfire insurance or to pay a tax modeled after the 
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shared responsibility payment model implemented by the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).191 
The WFIP would charge premiums based on the chosen level of coverage 
and the level of wildfire risk in the WUI area.192 For example, geographic are-
as could be designated high, medium, or low risk.193 The infrastructure is al-
ready in place to assess and map wildfire risk; the federal government maps 
flood risk through the NFIP and some states already assess and map wildfire 
risk.194 Private insurers have begun to use satellite mapping to better under-
stand the risk they underwrite.195 In fact, satellite mapping was instrumental in 
the decision by California insurers to stop insuring homes in California’s most 
fire-prone regions.196 To encourage participation in a NWIP, residents of a risk 
zone who fail to obtain wildfire insurance would be subject to a shared respon-
sibility payment modeled after the ACA individual mandate.197 
B. The Phase-in of Increased Premiums for Current WUI Residents 
Although actuarially sound premiums would be the centerpiece of a 
NWIP, Congress should take care not to unduly burden residents of the WUI 
by raising wildfire insurance rates all at once.198 The residents of the WUI, af-
ter all, are not directly to blame for the ballooning costs of wildfire manage-
ment.199 Nevertheless, the collective innocence of the residents of the WUI 
does not justify continuing to provide them with the implicit subsidy they cur-
rently receive.200  
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Congress has the reforms of the NFIP as a model for staggered premium 
increases.201 For example, the 2012 NFIP reform kept subsidies in place for 
primary residences until a sale of the home occurred, at which point premiums 
would readjust to risk-based rates.202 Congress could proceed with the NFIP 
model or it could gradually increase rates before a sale occurs, which would 
avoid potential grandfathering of property to maintain subsidized rates.203 Fur-
ther, proponents of further NFIP reform have proposed that the NFIP not cover 
second homes.204 Given the disproportionately high number of second homes 
in the WUI, however, it would be unfair and impractical to force such a large 
percentage of owners of fire-prone lands to go entirely uncovered.205 Such an 
exclusion would also likely be a major financial injury to many western com-
munities that rely on the spending of owner’s second homes.206 A practical 
middle ground under the proposed NWIP would be that second-home owners 
face substantially higher premiums.207 
C. Fire Mitigation Incentives 
A NWIP would also give the federal government the ability to promote 
sound land management practices among its policyholders.208 For example, 
premium rate reductions could be offered to those who take prescribed fire risk 
mitigating actions.209 Premium reductions could be offered to those who install 
metal roofs and create defensible spaces around their home.210 
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Historically, rural communities—particularly those in the west—have re-
sisted zoning and other land use regulation.211 Allowing premium reductions to 
those who chose to take mitigation steps sidesteps the problem of local opposi-
tion to land use regulation.212 Those who want to modify their property may do 
so and for those who do not need to, no community consensus (i.e., zoning) is 
required.213 Refunds and rate adjustments could be utilized to “make the bene-
fits of having coverage more salient and to incentivize individuals to engage in 
mitigation efforts.”214 
As in many other insurance reform proposals, there is an inevitable choice 
between eliminating cross-subsidization and crowding out private insurers.215 
Several insurance companies have offered proposals for reforming the flood 
insurance market in the NFIP context.216 They all, however, rely on federally-
backed reinsurance programs, or a “tax exception,” for the cost of flood insur-
ance, and thus continue to externalize the cost of living in harm’s way on the 
broader tax base.217 The proposed NWIP, though perhaps susceptible to being 
derided as a “socialist” takeover of the insurance market, offers the best oppor-
tunity for the federal government to place the costs of wildfire management 
squarely on those who benefit directly from those policies, thus mitigating the 
problem of cross-subsidization.218 
In the aftermath of the protracted political battle over the ACA, increases 
in the duties of FEMA and the Internal Revenue Service to manage a universal 
wildfire insurance plan are likely to face strong political objections.219 This 
Note does not endeavor to explain why wildfire insurance reform could be or 
would be more politically palatable than attempts to reform the NFIP or the 
ACA. Were the proposed NWIP to be implemented, inevitable detractors 
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would likely challenge its constitutionality.220 The proposed NWIP would like-
ly survive such challenges.221 
IV. THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER AND THE TRANSFERABILITY OF THE 
ACA INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TO OTHER EXTERNALIZED COSTS 
A. The Federal Taxing Power and Its Limitations 
The proposed National Wildfire Insurance Plan (“NWIP”) aims to miti-
gate the rising costs of wildfire management by using the federal taxing power 
as a means of influencing behavior that lies outside the reach of the federal 
power to regulate commerce.222 Specifically, it suggests a “homeowner man-
date” to compel residents of the Wildland-Urban Interface (“WUI”) to buy 
wildfire insurance from the federal government at risk-based rates or face a tax 
penalty for the costs their property ownership thrust on the tax paying pub-
lic.223 
 The U.S. Constitution grants Congress broad, but not limitless, powers of 
taxation.224 The limitations on the taxing power come from the Constitution’s 
requirements that direct taxes be apportioned among the states in proportion to 
population and that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform.”225 The 
Uniformity Clause was written into the Constitution because, at the time of 
framing, the loyalties of many Americans primarily rested with their respective 
states, not the nation as a whole.226 The Clause was thus included to prevent 
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groups of states from ganging up on others through economic exclusion or 
trade tariffs.227 
 It has been held that the Uniformity Clause allows progressive tax rates so 
long as the rate structure is uniform across state lines.228 The Uniformity 
Clause, however, does not require that Congress “devise a tax that falls equally 
or proportionally on each State.”229 This was evident in the Supreme Court’s 
holding in United States v. Ptasynski, where it considered the constitutionality 
of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.230 The Act imposed a domes-
tic oil tax but exempted oil produced in a remote area of Alaska.231 The Act 
was challenged by a group of domestic oil producers who did not qualify for 
the exemption.232 They claimed that the exemption violated the uniformity re-
quirement because Congress framed the “tax in terms of geographic bounda-
ries.”233 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the tax, draw-
ing on its earlier holding in the Head Money Cases that “the Uniformity Clause 
requires that an excise tax apply, at the same rate, in all portions of the United 
States where the subject of the tax is found.”234 
 The Uniformity Clause thus appears to be satisfied if the subject to be 
taxed is defined in non-geographic terms.235 The Court went further in Ptasyn-
ski, however, and held that the Clause does not necessarily prohibit Congress 
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from defining a subject to tax in geographic terms.236 Rather, the Court con-
cluded that, 
[T]he Uniformity Clause gives Congress wide latitude in deciding 
what to tax and does not prohibit it from considering geographically 
isolated problems . . . . [b]ut where Congress does choose to frame a 
tax in geographic terms, we will examine the classification closely 
to see if there is actual geographic discrimination.237 
In addition to the uniformity requirement, the Constitution also requires 
that “direct taxes” be apportioned among the states according to population.238 
In other words, a state with twice the population of another would have to pay 
twice the tax.239 The unfairness of such a tax is manifestly evident and one 
scholar has argued it is a political impossibility.240 
The distinction between direct and indirect taxes has a complicated histo-
ry in American jurisprudence.241 Although the U.S. Constitution does not de-
fine what a direct tax is, the general consensus prior to 1895 was that direct 
taxes “embraced only taxes on land . . . and poll or capitation taxes.”242 The 
1895 Supreme Court decision in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. threw a 
wrench in the federal tax structure by holding that the federal tax on income, 
“whether derived from rents or products, or otherwise, of real estate, or from 
bonds, stocks, or other forms of personal property,” was unconstitutional be-
cause it did not apportion said taxes among the states.243 The adoption of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, however, overruled the Pollock decision.244 The Six-
teenth Amendment provides that “Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
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taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several States.”245 
The Supreme Court has limited precedent on the distinction between di-
rect and indirect taxes, but it had the opportunity to revisit the subject in its 
consideration of the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) individual mandate.246 In finding that the shared responsi-
bility payment of the mandate was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s tax-
ing power, the Court held for the first time that a tax on inaction was not nec-
essarily a direct tax.247 In so holding, the Court has potentially provided Con-
gress with a tool to combat both widespread and localized problems presented 
by externalities.248 
B. NFIB v. Sebelius: The Constitutionality of the ACA  
Individual Mandate 
The ACA—the signature piece of legislation of President Barack 
Obama’s first term249—is aimed at reducing the cost of health care by limiting 
the externalities thrust onto the public when those without health insurance 
receive care.250 The Act intended to accomplish this by making it mandatory 
that all individuals sign up for at least a minimum level of health insurance.251 
Individuals who fail to comply with the individual mandate are forced to pay a 
penalty (a “shared responsibility payment”) to the federal government.252 The 
amount of this payment is calculated based on the individual’s household in-
come, “subject to a dollar-amount floor and a cap linked to the average cost of 
health insurance premiums.”253 Thus, subject to the cap, the more one earns, 
the larger their penalty will be for failing to procure insurance.254 Further, peo-
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ple with an income below a certain level are exempted from the shared respon-
sibility payment.255 
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the ACA individual mandate.256 The Court refused to uphold the 
mandate as a valid use of Congress’s commerce power.257 The Court justified 
the mandate, however, as a legitimate use of Congress’s taxing power.258 The 
Court held that the taxing power does not allow Congress to command indi-
viduals to buy insurance.259 It found, however, that the taxing power does al-
low Congress to impose a tax on those who choose not to buy insurance.260 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, found that the individual 
mandate’s penalty was, for constitutional purposes, a tax by using a “functional 
approach.”261 The opinion pointed to several aspects of the “shared responsi-
bility payment” that justified categorizing it as a tax.262 First, the payment 
would be less than the actual cost of procuring insurance.263 Second, the indi-
vidual mandate contains no scienter requirement.264 Lastly, the payment is col-
lected solely by the IRS.265 The Court had previously held that similar penal-
ties were unconstitutional if they rose to the level of “punitive sanctions.”266 
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Having determined that the shared responsibility payment is a tax, Chief 
Justice Roberts addressed whether it is a “direct tax.”267 The Court has long 
held that “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capita-
tion taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate.”268 Chief 
Justice Roberts concluded that because the shared responsibility payment was 
triggered by specific circumstances—not purchasing health insurance—it was 
not a capitation.269 Further, as the shared responsibility payment is “not a tax 
on the ownership of land or personal property,” it could be neither of the types 
of taxes known to be direct taxes.270 
One question that the National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius decision did not answer is whether the individual mandate is not a 
direct tax subject to apportionment because it is an income tax or an excise 
tax.271 According to Chief Justice Roberts, “no one would doubt that this law 
imposed a tax, and was within Congress’s power to tax.”272 One scholar has 
argued that a hypothetical in the opinion suggests that the Court views the 
mandate as an income tax.273 In the hypothetical, Congress enacts a statute that 
requires all homeowners to pay fifty dollars to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) if their home does not have energy efficient windows.274 The actual 
amount due is “adjusted based on factors such as taxable income and joint fil-
ing status, and is paid along with the taxpayer’s income tax return.”275 The im-
plication of this statement is that adjusting a tax for income makes it an income 
tax that is not subject to the apportionment requirement.276 On the other hand, 
there is evidence within the opinion that the Court regarded the tax as an ex-
cise because the trigger that attaches the penalty is the failure to obtain insur-
ance.277 
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The implications of Sebelius are not fully understood at this time.278 The 
federal government’s newly defined taxation powers after Sebelius, however, 
may allow it to reach problems that “lie beyond the scope of federal regulatory 
authority.”279 Such an application is central to the proposed NWIP.280 
C. Potential Legal Challenges to the NWIP and Why They Are  
Unlikely to Succeed 
The Supreme Court’s ruling on the ACA individual mandate increases the 
likelihood that the proposed NWIP could withstand judicial scrutiny.281 If, 
however, the litigation surrounding the ACA is any indication, interest groups 
that oppose the expansion of the federal government’s regulatory power will 
contest the plan.282 The NWIP presents some novel constitutional questions 
and a legal challenge could force the Supreme Court to further elucidate the 
reasoning behind its holding that the ACA shared responsibility payment is not 
subject to apportionment.283 
1. NWIP: An Unconstitutional Tax on Property? 
Opponents of the proposed NWIP “homeowner mandate” and subsequent 
“shared responsibility payment” for those who choose to forego wildfire insur-
ance will likely challenge it as a constitutionally impermissible tax on proper-
ty.284 Federal taxes on property are considered to be direct taxes that require 
apportionment among the states.285 Were the tax associated with the failure to 
procure fire insurance deemed a direct tax, each state would have to pay the 
tax in proportion to its population.286 Such a requirement would be fundamen-
tally at odds with the purpose of a national fire insurance program and unfair 
to certain residents of the WUI.287 The apportionment requirement and the 
program would be irreconcilable.288 
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The ACA individual mandate is considered an indirect tax because it is 
triggered by certain circumstances.289 It applies, however, to all people across 
the country who choose not to buy health insurance.290 The proposed NWIP 
homeowner mandate, on the other hand, would only apply to those who owned 
a home in the WUI risk area.291 Because of this difference, those challenging 
the law would likely argue that it is an unconstitutional federal property tax.292 
As opposed to the ACA individual mandate, the proposed tax has property 
ownership as an antecedent requirement.293 Thus, challengers may have a 
compelling argument that this is a constitutionally significant distinction be-
tween the two programs’ mandates.294 
Based on a literal reading of the Sebelius decision, however, the proposed 
tax should not be interpreted as a direct tax by virtue of it being a federal tax 
on property.295 Under the proposed plan, the tax should be considered an exac-
tion because it attaches as a result of owning a home in a wildfire risk zone 
without purchasing wildfire insurance.296 Following the logic of Sebelius, the 
shared responsibility payment is a tax on certain inaction, namely not procur-
ing minimum levels of health coverage.297 Similarly, the proposed mandate 
would be a tax on failure to procure fire insurance.298 Finally, the mere fact that 
property ownership is an antecedent requirement for the tax to attach does not 
make it an unconstitutional tax on property.299 Unapportioned federal income 
taxes on the sale of property, where property ownership is an antecedent re-
quirement, are constitutional.300 
If the Supreme Court were to clarify that it considers the ACA individual 
mandate to be an income tax, the NWIP would be partially insulated from con-
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stitutional challenge by having the penalty amount linked to income rather 
home values.301 On the other hand, if the Court viewed the individual mandate 
as an indirect tax, the proposed homeowner mandate would likely be upheld 
because WUI residents could choose to avoid the mandate’s tax simply by pro-
curing wildfire insurance through the NWIP.302 Erik Jensen, a proponent of a 
broad view of direct taxation, concedes that “an indirect tax is one which the 
ultimate consumer can generally decide whether to pay.”303 
2. NWIP: A Violation of the Uniformity Clause? 
Opponents of the NWIP might also challenge the law on the grounds that 
the Uniformity Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits a location-specific 
tax. The NWIP’s shared responsibility payment would disproportionately af-
fect citizens of western states and one could argue in earnest that such a tax 
does violence to the intention of the Uniformity Clause—preventing a larger 
group of states from ganging up on a smaller group through geography-
specific taxes.304 The Supreme Court’s Uniformity Clause jurisprudence, how-
ever, suggests that once a tax is defined as indirect, “Congress generally has no 
difficulty in meeting the uniformity requirement.”305 
In United States v. Ptasynski, the Supreme Court upheld legislation that 
exempted certain oil produced in Alaska from the tax.306 Opponents of the 
NWIP might try to distinguish the holding in Ptasynski because the Court held 
that a geography-based exemption from a tax was deemed constitutional,307 
whereas the NWIP’s entire tax would be inherently geography-based.308 Nev-
ertheless, this argument is weak in light of the fact that “there is no lack of uni-
formity . . . simply because the subject of the tax is not found in some 
states.”309 Tax law expert Lawrence Zelenak has argued that courts are unlikely 
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to strike down geographically defined taxes when Congress has attempted to 
address “geographically isolated problems.”310 
Opponents are unlikely to succeed in arguing that the NWIP contains ac-
tual geographic discrimination.311 The NWIP tax should not be seen as dis-
crimination against western states; rather it should be seen as a policy aimed at 
reducing the preferential treatment the western states have received through 
the implicit subsidy provided by federal wildfire suppression.312 As the Court 
has stated, “[t]he uniformity provision does not deny Congress power to take 
into account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to 
fashion legislation to resolve isolated problems.”313 
3. NWIP: An Illegal Federal Regulation of Private Property? 
Opponents of the NWIP could also challenge the portion of the proposal 
that would provide incentives to influence property management as an uncon-
stitutional federal regulation of private property.314 Federal regulation of state 
property development is not constitutional.315 For this reason, the zoning regu-
lations that are part of the NFIP must be enacted at the local level in order to 
receive federal subsidies under the program.316 Thus, the NFIP is an example 
of cooperative federalism whereby the states actually enact the federally ap-
proved zoning and property regulations in exchange for federal funds.317 Op-
ponents of the NWIP might argue that any premium discounts that provide 
incentives to manage one’s land to prevent fire—e.g., installing metal roofs—
are an unconstitutional regulation of property.318 
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Such a challenge is likely to fail because the insurance rate reductions 
granted for property management are completely voluntary.319 The federal 
government uses a multitude of tax incentives to influence individual behav-
ior.320 Further, the majority in Sebelius appears to have sanctioned a federal tax 
on those who fail to make certain energy efficient modifications to their 
homes.321 Of course, were such incentives so great that they constituted coer-
cion, they might be stuck down.322  
CONCLUSION 
The frequency and intensity of wildfires continue to increase in the Unit-
ed States. This, coupled with the rapid development of the Wildland-Urban 
Interface, or the WUI, is causing the cost of wildfire management to increase 
at alarming rates. Although these costs are borne by the general public, they 
only benefit the small segment of society that resides on the fringes of U.S. 
wildlands, in the WUI. This implicit subsidy has contributed to making the 
WUI the fastest growing category of real estate in America. 
In order to avoid a situation analogous to that caused by the National 
Flood Insurance Program, or the NFIP, Congress must force residents of the 
WUI to shoulder their fair share of the costs of wildfire management. President 
Barack Obama’s recent proposal to mitigate wildfire suppression costs does 
not answer this problem; in fact it makes the current wildfire problem look 
more and more like the failures of the NFIP, in that more federal dollars are 
being pumped into a faulty regime. Although the President’s plan claims to 
free up as much as $400 million in forest service funding—to be devoted to 
preventative measures—it does nothing to discourage development in the WUI 
or to shift costs to those who inhabit fire-prone lands. In fact, it continues to 
offer WUI resident the relative security of the current federal wildfire suppres-
sion regime. Providing additional federal funds to combat “disaster” scale fires 
increases the incentive to build there, just as the NFIP has encouraged building 
and rebuilding in flood-prone areas. 
President Obama’s plan does signal a renewed effort to focus more on 
prevention than suppression. The most effective way to reduce the cost of 
wildfires incurred by the general public, however, is to shift the costs of sup-
pression to homeowners of the WUI. This Note proposes that Congress enact a 
National Wildfire Insurance Plan, or the NWIP, that employs a homeowner 
mandate modeled after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act individ-
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ual mandate. The plan would encourage individuals to participate because fail-
ure to do so would result in a required payment of a shared responsibility tax. 
Such a plan, at the very least, would alleviate the problems of unfairness asso-
ciated with a wildfire management regime that is spending more and more tax 
dollars on a small segment of the population. Ideally, the proposed NWIP 
would also reduce the pace of development in the WUI by eliminating the im-
plicit subsidy provided by federal wildfire suppression efforts. In turn, the plan 
would slow the loss of our Nation’s wildlands and the degradation of the eco-
systems therein. 
